Auditing Procedures Overview

• • Test Deck Creation: Republican and Democrat machine technicians create a deck of test ballots marked with a specific pattern of votes. Memory cards are securely wiped before reuse, and results files are encrypted using a 256-bit randomized key that changes every election.
• • Initial L&A Testing: Technicians perform an initial Logic and Accuracy (L&A) test on every machine to ensure the results tape corresponds perfectly with the test vote pattern. The machines are unaware they are being tested and operate in Election Day mode.
• • Public Third-Party Audit: In the presence of a third-party CPA auditing firm, a public test is conducted. Auditors compare the original machine test tape to a newly created tape to verify machine accuracy and consistency.
• • Zero Tape Verification: After proving accurate, vote totals are reset to zero. Auditors sign off on a machine "zero tape" verifying all votes were cleared.
• • Tamper-Evident Sealing: Auditors witness technicians padlock seal the voting machine compartments with tamper-evident seals. The unique serialized number of each seal is recorded on a log sheet maintained by the auditors.
• • Secure Storage: Machines remain locked and sealed in a secure, video-monitored, limited-access location. On voting days, seals are verified intact by bipartisan election officials.

The third-party CPA auditing firm maintains a continuous presence at the election commission office throughout the night.

• • Seal Verification: When machines return from precincts, the CPA auditors verify that the numbered seals match the pre-election log before memory cards are removed. If a seal is broken or lost, that precinct is automatically flagged for post-election auditing.
• • Chain of Custody: Memory cards are hand-carried by staff with multiple witnesses to the central count server room.
• • Upload Auditing: An auditor sits beside the staff member uploading results to verify successful transfers. Periodic summary reports are generated to ensure all votes properly transferred from the memory cards to the central count server.
• • Audit Selection: Each commissioner chooses three precincts they want audited. From those, the auditor randomly selects five. The Administrator of Elections selects one additional precinct, ensuring a minimum of six precincts are audited. Any precincts with reported irregularities are also added to this pool.

• • Precinct Hand Count: The day after the election, CPA auditors conduct a hand count of ballot applications, ballot stubs, and poll book signatures for the selected precincts to ensure consistency with machine vote counts. All unused ballots are also accounted for.
• • Early Voting Audit: Auditors randomly select a day and location of early voting and perform a hand count of ballot applications, comparing it against system records to ensure the numbers match exactly.
• • Mandatory Statutory Audit: Per TCA 2-20-103, after each August and November election, ballots (including early voting, absentee, and Election Day) for randomly selected precincts are re-run on randomly selected tabulators to ensure top race results do not deviate by 1% between unofficial results and the audit.